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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

COMPENSATION METHODS FOR DEMAND RESPONSE
Recently, more and more disputations about how demand response should be
compensated have arisen. Moreover, the court is about to rehear the Order 745. It
probably will have significant impact on the whole working system used to be built for
demand response before. Nowadays, some power companies and utilities think that they
will endure profits leakage while demand response resources still are compensated.
In this research, knowledge of demand response, local marginal price, Order 745 and
other related concept will be explained in detail in case of misunderstanding. Associated
with all these knowledge, a possible compensation method will be proposed. It combines
many existing compensation methods. It mainly can be divided into three parts, i.e., high
load period, off-peak period and low load period. The demand response resources will be
compensated appropriately through these three periods. The compensation method
endeavors to be just and reasonable.
KEYWORDS: Demand Response, Local Marginal Price, Compensation Methods, Order
745.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Recently, there are more and more disputations about how demand response
works in the wholesale energy market and whether compensation methods of demand
response are just and reasonable or not. Besides, if the full court finally makes its
decision to rehear the case, it can overturn Order 745 which will be briefly introduced in
the first part of this section. The other part in chapter one explains why there are so many
problems about the Order being raised. The target of whole paper is to solve disputations
and optimize current compensation methods through study of the Order 745 and relevant
materials.

1.1

Order 745
What is the Order 745? With increasing deployment of renewable energy sources

including wind, hydro and solar, together with traditional oil and coal based generation, it
becomes more important to keep efficiency and stability of our wholesale energy market.
The main purpose of Order No. 745 is to help wholesale energy markets to operate
effectively to balance energy supply and demand. How does it work? The Order gives
explanation that Demand Response (DR) plays as an alternative energy source to
maintain the balance. When there is an outage and blackout, demand response programs
will serve as an alternative resource to inform their customers to reduce energy
consumption. Moreover, when the energy price is high enough because of high load
demand, demand response will inform their customers as well. When either above
condition meets, the demand response resource has to be compensated for its service at
the energy market price referred as the Locational Marginal Price (LMP). In conclusion,
1

the Order not only ensures competitiveness of demand response resources in wholesale
energy markets but also removes barriers that prohibit participation of demand response
resources. Moreover, the Order makes sure that the wholesale energy price preserve at
just and reasonable rate with help of demand response. Last but not least, it lays down
authority for demand response to sustain system reliability and satisfy resource
sufficiency by quick response to balance the electricity grid. The Commission does
understand that in the future, the modification of dispatch algorithms will become even
more difficult so that it requires each ISO or RTO to perform the net benefits test
determining a basis every month. The basis is founded mostly on historical data that
cover the previous year’s supply curve. It is also necessary for ISO or RTO to develop a
mechanism in which the probability is analyzed when it is cost-effective to compensate
demand response resources with full LMP. One more important thing of Order 745 is that
each ISO or RTO still set own compensation methods even the Order spends many pages
in discussing how to compensate demand response. Those discussions will be analyzed
and debated in detail later.

1.2

The coming problems of Order No. 745
As mentioned before, the full court is about to votes to rehear the case which may

rescind Order 745. One of the problems is that Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) keeps the authority, which was approved by Congress under the Federal Powers
Act (FPA), to regulate the wholesale energy price. However the Federal Powers Act
doesn’t articulate what exactly should be done with demand response which means that
the specific compensation method is not set. Therefore, there comes the confusion. The

2

Commission only rules that the compensation has to be relevant to LMP. Judging from
previous experience, courts usually process the determination made by agencies like
FERC who provide expertise on things which they regulated. Meanwhile the Commission
made its decision mostly based on suggestions, feedback, and comments from ISO/RTO,
DR companies, and DR customers. Therefore, we can infer that opinions from generator
part are probably neglected. Moreover, although Order 745 successfully paved an entry
for DR into the wholesale energy market without encroaching on state rights, the demand
response resource is not restricted by a state’s decision or law. In addition, the Order was
supposed to achieve the goal that demand response should be fairly and justly treated in
the energy market so that it could compete with other traditional electricity resources
such as coal, natural gas, and wind power. But currently, the court has decided to
“devalue demand response in wholesale energy markets and reduced the incentive for
demand response providers to offer this service.”1 In a word, the court doubts former
value which was by demand response resources under permission of Order 745.
Moreover, in order to remove barriers that prohibit participation of demand response, the
Commission greatly supports the wholesale energy market being competitive. On the
other hand, Judge Janice Roger Brown, who might represent for viewpoint of the court,
demonstrated that FERC removed barriers way too much instead of simply removing
barriers. To keep consistent with the removing barriers rule in Order 890, the
Commission further modified the Open Access Transmission Tariff allowing resources
which cannot generate power themselves, especially demand response resources, to share
and use most of ancillary services which were used to be built for generation resources in
order 745. This could be on of reasons bringing unjust profits to demand response. Based
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on the feedback and comments, some people think that demand response resources can
take advantages of the platform which has been built between ancillary services and
generation resources.
Additionally, Judge Janice Roger Brown’s continued to state, “The issue at hand
was not just whether the payments were too high, but rather who has the authority to set
those payments.”2 This will bring back the question that the method of setting those
payments is ambiguous. Although the Commission makes the rule that compensation to
demand response resource must be based on its service and the market energy price that
refers to local marginal price, the approach how to lay down payment is quite different
from every ISO and RTO. Each ISO or RTO still uses its own way to deal with demand
response resource to reach maximum interest even the Commission makes the final call.
This problem will be exaggerated and particularly discussed during the comments part.
Demand response provider can achieve both reducing energy consumption and
maximizing profits under current conditions. On the other hand, it probably neglects the
damage to generation sources or other companies who may endure interest leakage. For
the defense of Order 745, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission stated that it didn’t
guarantee everyone’s profit. Another problem is that the demand response, modified
under Order 745 somehow raised energy payments instead of decreasing them. There is
another saying that only large companies, like commercial and industrial customers,
could understand enough about demand response and then invest in the economic DR
market to gain profits. Some power producers also raise their concerns about
compensation of demand response is that the energy price is not only raised but also
unfair that “those customers have already been compensated in the form of lower power
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bills from using less energy”. For example, some DR companies, such as EnerNoc and
Viridity Energy, were already praised for the fair way to compensate customers for
implementing real-time power-down technology in their buildings and factories.3 This
situation is called overcompensation. Some ISO and RTO compensate DRR with LMP
which was regarded as a double payment which will be introduced in the discussion part.
No matter how demand response is known as an effective way to reduce energy use,
some U.S. utility trade groups and power producers begin to stand against Order 745 on
demand response part.
It cannot be denied that rehearing may lead undercut or even discard one of the
brightest energy future, demand response. Actually, any innovation grows with
disputations. The development of demand response really needs time and patience. This
thesis carries the opinion that it is unnecessary for the court to hold rehearing. Instead,
certain modification can facilitate demand response to work better and contribute more in
the energy market. In the following parts, advantages of demand response and reunderstanding of Order 745 explain how effective an energy market will be with the
operation of demand response.

Chapter 2 Chapter 2 Re-understand Order 745, Final Rule
Even though decision of rehearing the case won’t affect DR keeps playing more
and more important role in energy markets, such as PJM, a setback will happen. In order
to avoid such bad situation happening, this part is dedicated to deeply introduce the Order
745 and provide suggestion about optimizing DR.

5

2.1

Wholesale energy market
According the Final Rule, the compensation methods are introduced through

organized wholesale energy market which contains two parts, Regional Transmission
Organization (RTO) and Independent System Operator (ISO). What’s the wholesale
energy market? As we all know, electricity is normally generated by a power company.
However, it won’t be directly delivered to its end-use customers. Instead, it has to be
purchased and re-sold for a bunch of times before reaching the end-use customers just
like other commodity such as oil and stock. In summary, a wholesale energy market
should consist of sale and re-sale processes. Basically, anyone can take part in the
wholesale energy market under certain approvals. One condition is that power providers
can become effective participants only when there is a customer or more who are willing
to purchase those providers’ power output. For individual trader and power marketers,
they can buy and resell power through the market instead of generating energy if they
want to participate in the wholesale energy market. There are many types of these
participators. They include competitive independent power producers (IPPs). They do not
belong to any utilities. For example, individuals purchase photovoltaic boards to generate
power for individual use or sale to preferential power utilities. Participations can also be
power suppliers and market traders connected to utilities. Traditional integrated utilities
become participations when they begin selling extra power.4 The competition among
these participations have to be fair and just. Demand response resource doesn’t produce
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energy at all and it is defined as a service instead of sale and resale energy marketers.
Now, the brief structure of wholesale energy market will be introduced. There are two
kinds of operation methods in the U.S. The most common trade which is widely applied
in the wholesale energy market is multi-state interconnection. It can be regarded as
interstate sales. In this operation method, the wholesale energy market is regulated across
the country under ISOs and RTOs. It covers the region of Northeast, California, MidAtlantic, much of the Midwest, and ERCOT. But the ERCOT doesn’t perform as others
do. ERCOT’s entire line lies only in state, Texas, and it has no connection with other
states. The ISO/RTO structure guarantees the competition as well. Actually, two-thirds of
the electricity is spent through ISO/RTO in the U.S. The other operation way is known as
a traditional operation method. The regions including the Southeast, Southwest,
Northwest, Inter-Mountain West, and vertically-integrated utilities still observe and take
charge of transmission lines. More importantly, it will choose its favored generation
resource instead of more effective and energy saving one to dispatch electricity during
certain hours because of no competition of multi-state.
2.1.1

Day-ahead and real-time energy markets
The wholesale energy market also can be divided into day-ahead and real-time

markets. The day-ahead market calculates and determines the LMPs one day before the
operating day. Normally, it will inform its customers and allow them to trade wholesale
electricity in order to help them avoid changeable energy price. The LMPs are based on
demand bids, generation offers, transactions, and so on.5 The advantage of this market is
that payment of its customers is settled. On the other hand, the real-time market is
calculating current LMPs at several minutes interval which will directly reveals actual
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grid operating conditions. For example, New England’s ISO (NEISO) sets the interval as
5 minutes. Moreover, different from a day-ahead market, participants of the real-time
energy market can trade the electricity during operating day. The advantage of real-time
energy market is its flexibility. It can immediately supply the real-time demand to keep
the balance of grid. Therefore, the difference between two markets can be met.
Meanwhile, a separate and second financial settlement will be created by the real-time
energy market as well. The real-time LMP will be predicated and then established. It is
used to be a standard to charge customers or compensate electricity reduction and
generation in the day-ahead energy market.6 However, the difficulties of predicting and
measuring real-time energy price are obvious.
For the convenience of their customers and themselves, most ISOs and RTOs will
provide them plenty of information which they are willing to know. Customers can
directly view their information online or download them for later use after they log in
own accounts. The information will be illustrated through column, line, and pie charts
including and tables. All of them demonstrate all kinds of energy price, management of
loads, day-ahead and real-time LMP, and actual power system condition.7 With the help
of above information, the customers can read grid condition easily and make appropriate
decisions.

2.2

Process of decision made
The section mainly explains that why it is unfair to revoke Order 745. First of all,

every decision made in the Order has been discussed thoughtfully. For example, on
March 18, 2010, the Commission, in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) raised

8

a way to eliminate current concerns that may prevent meaningful demand-side’s
participation. Before carrying out the final action, there are about 3,800 pages of
comments being reviewed and a technical conference being held subsequently. Therefore,
there are many complicated processes before the Commission makes the final decision.
As mentioned in the beginning, the Commission cannot guarantee everyone’s profit. In
the discussion part, the Commission will tell that how difficultly and carefully it makes
the final determination. Therefore, it is unfair to turn over everything about demand
response in Order 745. Demand response will become more developed in management,
rules, and restriction under certain modification with time.

2.3

Cost-effectiveness conditions and Net benefit test
Under definition, a demand response resource has the ability to maintain the

balance between supply and demand as an alternative generation resource under RTO and
ISO’s structure. Meanwhile, it is important to make sure the efficiency of demand
response when it serves as an alternative resource. Cost-effectiveness condition and net
benefit test are two related components in Order 745 to determine when demand response
has to be compensated at energy price referred to LMP. Therefore, it is reasonable to
compensate demand response when it is cost-effective which is determined by the net
benefits test.
2.3.1

Net benefit test
Before implementing the net benefits test, both RTO and ISO are required to

approximately predict that at what price level when demand response will be costeffectively dispatching. Moreover, the price level is usually based on former supply curve
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and real time changing condition. Therefore, the level should be updated frequently. In
conclusion, the ISO or RTO should determine the monthly threshold price that represent
for the standard of net benefit test. Under following situation, dispatching demand
response will have net benefit effect. As DR resource plays as an alternative generation
resource, it will reduce the overall LMP because it substitutes other generation resources.
Dispatching DR will be cost-effective when advantages from reduced LMP which is
caused by demand response are beyond the spending of dispatching and paying LMP to
demand response resources. In conclusion, the net benefit test becomes a critical
condition to decide whether the dispatch of DR resources is cost-effective or not.
2.3.2

Cost-effectiveness conditions
Cost-effectiveness conditions are especially important because the Commission

can apply compensation approach only when demand response resources are
satisfactorily capable and cost-effective. It is widely known that customers are paying
bills based on how many energy units (MWh) they consume. Additionally, change in the
size of energy market will relatively vary the LMP. When the amount of the load, which
is supposed to pay the electricity bill, decreases, cost per unit ($/MWh) will be
unintentionally increased because of dispatching demand response resources.
Furthermore, it will break the balance of wholesale load. This possible result is regarded
as the billing unit effect when demand response is delivered. On the other hand,
generation resources dispatching does not lead a drop of load, there won’t be the billing
unit effect.

10

2.4

Cost allocation
In the accounting category, cost allocation is a process of providing relief to

shared service organization's cost centers that provide a product or service. In turn, the
associated expense is assigned to internal clients' cost centers that consume the products
and services.8 In the research, cost allocation is the process that cost will be reasonably
distributed to one or more groups. Costs can be allocated only arrangement and cost
allocation of the work are in the same proportion. In addition, there must be direct benefit
proof related to those cost. Demand response resources are allocable if they benefit
energy market from energy deduction. Furthermore, if the expense is used on multiple
projects, it is necessary to determine proportion of the expense and benefits spent on each
project then charge accordingly. When allocating multiple projects costs, the Principal
Investigator working with the Research Administrators must ensure two things. One of
them is that the costs are reasonable; the other one is that costs allocated for each one
project should have appropriate documentation which reflects the Principal Investigator’s
judgment and indicate percentages or amounts of benefits in every project. The allocation
method must be reasonable and must relate to the costs being charged. There are several
points about allocation which need to be remembered. First of all, some documents such
as headcount, square footage or hours directly relate to received benefit, have to be
remembered. Moreover, some allocation methodologies, like budge, funding or available
funds, is forbidden. Additionally, administrative expenses won’t be regarded as one part
of sponsored project to be charged. More importantly, allocation methodologies should
be documented, auditable, and reviewed and updated periodically to ensure they are
reasonable.9
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Allocation method is generally based on effort or usage. Here is an example
explaining allocation based on effort. There are two projects, A and B. A researcher
spends 80% effort on A and the rest effort on B. The researcher spends total $5,000 on
those projects. Since expense is directly related to the percentage of effort devoted to the
project. Therefore, $4,000 (80% of $5,000) is charged to A and the rest, $1,000, is
charged to B. What’s going on if allocation method is based on usage? Suppose the
maintenance fee of a computer lab is $10,000. The computer system is only available to
class A and B. A reasonable base to allocate the expense would be computer user hours.
Class A occupies the lab 150 hours in total. And class B takes advantage of the lab 50
hours. Based on usage allocation method, the cost allocated to class A is $7,500 (100/200
x $10,000). On the other hand, the cost allocated to project B would be $2,500 (50/200 x
$1,000).
The allocation method for demand response will be discussed below. Now please
forget about the U.S. court’s opinion about vacating Order 745 at this moment, most
ISO/RTO markets admit the capability of Demand Response Resource (DDR) capability.
For example, MISO shows great willingness to implement DDR in its market. This Final
Rule requires that each ISO and RTO to raise a method to allocate payments of demand
response if their clients gain benefits from the lower LMP because of applying demand
response. In accordance with Order 745, MISO worked with stakeholders to determine
the best method for allocating costs for demand response. During that process, there are
two keys which need be paid attention to. First of all, when Locational Marginal Price
(LMP) is greater than the threshold for net benefit test, the right method to compensate
demand response resource, take LMP as an example here, needs to be chosen carefully.
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Secondly, cost allocation for demand response should be applied with necessarily the
same proportion amount of load reduction in each location. Surcharges applied to all
buyers in the real-time energy market in the applicable zone pro rata.10
Here is an example which ISO-NE used to test the impact of demand response
cost allocation methods on basic service rates and on overall consumer costs for two
compensation methods to demand response, DR providers are paid the locational
marginal price less the retail generation rate and the full LMP for demand reductions.11
LMPt represent for LMP at hour t; Lt is the loads at hour t; Dt means demand reductions
at hour t; Gt is the generator’s output at hour t; RR is the retail generation rate. The
superscript 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 or 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 is used to represent for the price or the quantity applied in the dayahead market or the real-time market. In the first compensation method, which is paying
LMP-G to demand response, three payments from generator, LSE and DR are added
together. There yields a positive settlement imbalance, missing money, equal
to (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 − 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅) × 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 . When there is no DR’s participation, the profit of LSE will

become 𝑃𝑃0 = ∑𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0(−𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 + 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅0 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 ). Customer payment (C0) under basic

situation is 𝐶𝐶0 = ∑𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅0 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 , which obviously is the last part of former equation.
When all DR costs are allocated to the LSE, then the profit of LSE is

𝑃𝑃1 = ∑𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0(−𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 + 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅1 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 ). In this equation, it implies that LSE has to make

up the missing money. And 𝐶𝐶1 𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 ∑𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅1 × (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 )When LDC is required to pay all
DR costs, the profit of LSE becomes 𝑃𝑃2 = ∑𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0[−𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 + 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅2 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 + (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 −

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅2 ) × 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 ] where 𝐶𝐶2 = ∑𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅2 × (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 ) + ∑𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅2 ) 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 . In order to
compare customers’ payment, all profits of LSE are set to zero. It is meaningless to
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analyze the condition when t is equal to zero. Then Table 2.1 shows the equation of retail
rate at three different situations.
𝑇𝑇

𝑡𝑡=0

𝑡𝑡=0

�(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 ) / � 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡

RR0

𝑇𝑇

𝑇𝑇

�(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 ) / � 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡

RR1

RR2

𝑇𝑇

𝑡𝑡=0

𝑇𝑇

𝑡𝑡=0
𝑇𝑇

�[𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 )] / �(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 )
𝑡𝑡=0

𝑡𝑡=0

Table 2.1Retail rate for compensation method, LMP-G
Compare these rates and have relation RR2 < RR1 = RR0. Substitute these three RR back
to the customer’s payments and process the comparison, C1 < C2 < C0.
Similarly, when the compensation to demand response is only LMP,
𝑃𝑃1′ = ∑𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0[−𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 + 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅1′ × (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 )] 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑃𝑃2′ = ∑𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0[−𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 ) +

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅2′ × (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 )]. The customer’s payment will become 𝐶𝐶1′ = ∑𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅1′ × (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 ) =

∑𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐶𝐶2′ = ∑𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅2′ × (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 ) + ∑𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 = ∑𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 ×

𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 The difference is that there applied a hybrid method that the cost is allocated into the
LSE and the LDC each hour respectively. Then 𝑃𝑃3′ = ∑𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0[−𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 + 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅3′ × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 ].
And 𝐶𝐶3′ = ∑𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅3′ × (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 ) + ∑𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅3′ × 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 = ∑𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 . Therefore, no

matter how the rate changes in the second compensation method, customers’ payments
stay the same. There are listed three retail rates for the second compensation method
when profit of LSE is set to zero. Table 2.2 reveals the above situation.
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𝑇𝑇

𝑇𝑇

𝑡𝑡=0

𝑡𝑡=0

�(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 ) / �(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 )

’

RR1

𝑇𝑇

𝑇𝑇

�[𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 )] / �(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 )

RR2’

𝑡𝑡=0

𝑡𝑡=0

𝑇𝑇

𝑇𝑇

�(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 ) / � 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡

’

RR3

𝑡𝑡=0

𝑡𝑡=0

Table 2.2 Retail rate for compensation method, LMP
Table 2.3 compares all retail rates and customers’ payments,
Retail Generation Rate

Consumer Payments

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅1′ > 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅1

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1′ > 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅2′ = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅2

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2′ > 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅3′ = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅1 and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅3′ > 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅2 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶3′ > 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1 and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶3′ > 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2
Table 2.3 Comparison of two compensation methods

2.5

Benefits of Order 745
In this chapter, benefits of applying Order 745 will be introduced. In this way,

people can notice the advantages of applying Order 745 and the court may change the
idea about rehearing the Order.
2.5.1

Effectiveness
As mentioned at the beginning of the article, one of great benefits of the Order

745 is it facilitates DR to balance energy supply and demand. It is needed to keep the
wholesale energy markets operating effectively. During that process, DRR encourages its
customers to reduce electricity consumption in response to price signals which will be
introduced in the Demand Response part later.
15

2.5.2

Functioning and Competition
In Order 745, the FERC greatly removes barriers of participating in wholesale

energy market for demand response resources to support competitive wholesale energy
markets. Under the Open Access Transmission Tariff, demand response programs are
supposed to be treated same as generation and they are allowed to participate into the
wholesale energy market without restrictions. Furthermore, to ensure functioning of
demand response, transmission provider is required to share it transmission pathway to
all resources, including demand response, without bias. Therefore, those resources can
compete with each other equally. Associated with Order No. 719, RTOs and ISOs can
accept bids when demand response performs as ancillary services competing with other
resources on a comparable basis under the permission of the Commission. The
Commission also required each RTO and ISO to modify its existing market rules to
reflect energy price during an operating reserve shortage. All the processes mentioned
above can effectively encourage the innovation and participation of new generation and
demand resources.
In addition, order 745 enormously helps demand response to increase competition
although great competition may bring fluctuation of the energy price for the wholesale
energy market. Therefore, the Commission is responsible for regulating the compensation
methods that ensures electric energy at fair, reasonable and practical rates. In Order 719,
demand response can expand the wholesale competition that turn out to be effective only
when consumers are being provided with enough supply options, development and
innovation of demand response are highly encouraged, performance of demand response
resource is improved, energy cost is affected and then saved, and customers perhaps get
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rid of risks.12 To ensure the functioning and competiveness of wholesale energy markets,
several ways are going to be demonstrated. First of all, demand response not only
facilitates RTOs and ISOs in balancing supply and demand but also helps electricity
maintain at just and reasonable prices when its bid is directly guided into the wholesale
market. The customers will provide a feedback signal, which informs the RTO or ISO
and energy market that they would like to reduce energy consumption, in response to the
reduced-load signal stimulated by RTO/ISO and energy market. According to report
provided by PJM, a small amount of decreased load will lead a larger amount of dropping
price. For example, a three percent reduction in load has equivalent effect of a 6 to 12
percent price decline at peak load hours. In a word, demand response has the ability to
flatten load curve. High-priced resources also will be less dispatched with help of demand
response. Ultimately, the cost of producing energy will be lowered as well. Secondly,
demand response provides electricity reliability in the short-term and resource adequacy
in the long-term. More importantly, it can mitigate generator market power. A power
supplier has to undertake the risk that it may not possess the ability to dispatch the
electricity if the bid price is too high. The downward pressure comes from participation
of demand response. Last but not least, when energy outage or blackout suddenly
happens, demand response resources are capable of bringing electricity grid back into
balance quickly. For example, in the winter of 2014, when people in the Northeast area
greatly used electricity to keep warm inside their house, a disaster came to them. Because
of severely cold weather, up to 20% of power plants were off-line. Luckily, demand
response stimulated customers to reduce their electricity usage by 1,900 MW in parts of
the Midwest and Northeast which is covered by ‘PJM Interconnection’.13 Hence, demand
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response can potentially support system reliability, which means to prevent forced
outages and blackouts from happening, and solve the challenges and problems from
unexpected loss of generation to sustain functioning of the wholesale energy market.
2.5.3

Compenstation Method
There are several reasons, such as unique state authority and transmission

congestion, which may cause difficulties unifying compensation methods. Therefore, the
Commission gives its permission to each RTO and ISO so that they can develop their
own compensation methodologies. In this case, the compensation levels for demand
response will differ tremendously among RTOs and ISOs. There are listed three different
compensation methods below. For example, in PJM Interconnection, it pays demand
response with the LMP minus the generation retail rate. Although the ISO-NE tested both
LMP and LMP-RR payment, demand response is still compensated by LMP when prices
jump over the threshold level. Usually, the setting threshold points are quite different
between the RTOs. According to Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator
Inc.’s (Midwest ISO), demand response resources are paid LMP in both day-ahead and
real-time markets.
There is a saying that one of the reasons causing so many disputations is various
compensation methods among ISOs and RTOs. In this research, there eventually
proposes one optimal method for compensating demand response based on current
methods. The method probably can mitigate controversies.
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2.6

Discussion in Order 745
There are many discussions on compensation level of demand response resources,

net benefit test, measurement and verification, cost allocation and the Commission
jurisdiction. The Commission here hopes to reach uniformity and conclude the final
determination through plenty of comments on those different subjects.
2.6.1

Compensation level
If both generation and demand response resource offer equivalent service to

RTOs and ISOs, the NOPR will promise to comparably treat and compensate generation
and demand response providers for their cost. It states as well that the proposed
compensation was intended to encourage participation of demand response resources in
wholesale energy market. Moreover, investment fee will be fully covered as an
encouragement method if it is related to technology of demand response such as
advanced metering. Before the final determination, the Commission expected various
comments on compensation, especially on comparability and flexibility of generation and
demand response resources. Commenters also give opinions about approaches to
compensate demand response. For instance, when payment of LMP should be effective
by hours or in what kind of condition LMP should apply in hours. Additionally, the
Commission sought comments on net benefits test in supplemental NOPR.
Some commenters announce that a MW increment of generation is physically
comparable to the same amount of electricity decrement. For the purpose of balancing
supply and demand in both energy markets, they have same influence. These commenters
believe that demand response can play as a superior service to generation by providing a
quick response in advanced meter system and saving money from constructing new
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energy generation facilities. Therefore, substitution of demand response for generation
will create great system flexibility when some parts of the generation do not functionally
work. Moreover, they insist that distinguishing the physical characteristics between
generation and demand response is not only difficult but also unacceptable at present.
Demand response will improve the competition of market that forces manage load and
indistinguishableness treatment in advance. Therefore, they suggest that demand
resources must be paid LMP same as generator is paid if their bids are accepted by the
grid operator for the purpose of reaching grid balance. Other commenters hold different
opinion against that generation is physically equal to demand response. For example,
Public Service Electric and Gas (PSEG) argues that one MW drop of consumed energy
created by demand response is incommensurable compared to the contribution made by a
MW energy generated by generation. In its defense, demand response is usually used to
operate only in a limited number of times during the peak period. According to a report
of PJM, demand response only effectively performs 10 times and six hours between each
response during the entire summer peak period. In contrast, generators are available for
deliver power from time to time except when there is scheduled maintenance and
unpredictable outages. The argument sticks with the idea that although demand response
resources can become backups for generation resources, the service provided by the
generation resources still is superior to service provided by demand response resources
because demand response has huge positive effect only for a short time. For a long period
operation, demand responses becomes unnecessary most of time. They continue pointing
out that demand response aims to reduce energy consumption while generators are able to
serve electricity consumption. Their argument is that demand reduction does not turn on
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the lights. Demand reduction can only allow extra electron created by the reduction to
serve a different customer. More importantly, generating plants are able to support a
power system functionally without any demand response. On the contrary, demand
response cannot serve a power plant alone. Moreover, traditional generators can provide
system with ancillary features such as governor response or reactive power voltage
support. Those features cannot be guaranteed by demand response resources.
Economically, there are two totally opposite attitude about the comparability of
demand response and generator. Some people indicate that any compensation methods
for demand response beyond LMP minus the generation (or G) component of the retail
rate are unjust and unreasonable because demand response provider will receive
overcompensation at this point. It does bring demand reduction but break the economic
efficiency. The double-payment is also one kind of overcompensations when
compensation is LMP. In double-payment, demand response providers will receive not
only the cost savings from not consuming an increment of electricity at a retail rate but
also a LMP compensation for not consuming the increment of electricity. Simultaneously,
any compensation except LMP-G, like paying LMP, will gain company unreasonable
profit and break the efficient balance even benefits of consuming electricity exceed
advantages of being compensated at LMP. From Dr. Hogan’s viewpoint, in order to
achieve economic efficiency, demand response compensation has to be implemented at
the LMP under real-time pricing situation. But in reality, it is impossible currently. While
he believes that compared to pay LMP, it is better to balance demand responses and
generations if payment to demand response compensation is the amount of LMP-G or
other approaches. Based on the argument of the New York Commission, when the
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payment to demand response is LMP-G, there would be a problem in tracking retail rates
among multiple utilities would result in an administrative burden of tracking retail rates
for the multiple utilities. The administrative burden of tracking rates may produce undue
confusion for retail customers. There would be administrative difficulties for state
commissions and ISOs/ RTOs as well.14
Some commenters would like to believe that demand response resource acts like a
sale and resale energy resource because it purchase the power in the day-ahead market
and resell it in the real-time market. Some of them even assert that demand response
providers perform much better than a reselling energy because it actually possesses the
electricity. On the other hand, other commenters state that there won’t be too much
demand reduction if demand response providers compel their customers to purchase and
resell electricity. They firmly believe that it is erroneous and flawed to treat demand
response as one kind of energy being purchased and then resold. Actually, the
Commission officially rejected former definition of demand response as a reselling
energy in EnergyConnect. Under the Commission’s description, demand response is
more like a service rather than a reselling energy.
Other demand response supporters disagree with Dr. Hogan’s judgement that
paying LMP for demand response will break the balance between demand response
resources and generators. They think compensation to demand response at LMP
providers does not create more advantage for demand response over generators. They
demonstrate that Dr.Hogan’s arguments ignore various locations in the wholesale power
markets, exaggerate limits of the Commission’s jurisdiction, misunderstand affects
caused by unstable condition such as fuels pricing, environmental attributes, participation,
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and so on. The arguments also fail to account for other complex parts such as difference
among prices, equipment operational requirements, etc.
Besides physical and economic aspects, a lot of commenters separately compare
the environmental effects triggered by both generation and demand response resources.
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) reports that current market prices easily neglect
issues created by generation. Traditional generations generate power with air pollution
and greenhouse effect; power plants occupy huge lands; maintenance fee of those plants
are high. These social impacts will become especially fluctuant at high load period. It is
obvious that demand response does not produce greenhouse emission at all. Therefore,
demand response should be compensated more than LMP. On the contrary, some people
suggest that paying LMP for demand response is meaningless because it merely
encourage load to be switched off but still being compensated. Under this situation, some
generations which are not under management of advanced meters produce more
greenhouse gases and air pollution.
Some commenters suggest not paying demand response LMP in all hours because
it won’t bring net benefits to customers from time to time, especially at off-peak time.
They hold opinions that demand response providers can be only praised at LMP when
advantages of dispatching demand response carrying energy reduction from are over cost
of paying demand response resources as net benefits or cost-effectiveness test describes.
According to experience, net benefits can reach enormously huge at peak period which
potentially means demand response has apparently positive affect at peak period and a
cost effective test may be unnecessary. Thus, some commenters consider that the purpose
of either of these two tests would be to decide in what condition payment of LMP can
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apply. The equilibrium point will be set at the time when the benefits created by reducing
load are equal to the payments to demand response. People those who against use a net
benefit test firmly believe that a net benefits test is not only one reason to reduce
competition but also costly and complex to implement. No matter what the compensation
for demand response resources will be, the generation and demand response should be
properly compensated based on the contribution they devote to the system. Moreover, the
rules can be applied to both resources.
From all feedback stated above, those feedback are split in different groups. The
Commission gets to summarize and conclude those opinions into several compensation
levels for demand response resources. One part of them is paying the LMP for demand
reductions in all hours in both day-ahead and real-time energy markets, another group
insists that it is appropriate to compensate demand response LMP for energy
consumption reductions it contributes only when it is cost- effective, and the rest opposes
compensation LMP for demand reductions under any conditions believing that it will lead
a distortion or over-compensation. When the Commission makes the judgment of these
diverging comments, it will both consider restriction from economic analysis and take the
practical realities of how markets work into account as well because the compensation
method involves no technical part when policy associated with regulatory mission. Since
the Commission concludes three general conditions, it begins to response to those
conditions respectively. First of all, based on the various comments and record from ISOs,
the Commission agrees that compensation of LMP to demand response resources should
be set under the conditions that the payment is cost-effective determined as the net
benefits test described. When the following two conditions meet, any payment except the
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LMP from an RTO or ISO to demand response is unjust and inappropriate. Moreover, the
marginal value of the resource is revealed. The first condition is that DRR is capable of
providing the service as a substitution to generation resources in order to help to maintain
the balance between supply and demand. The requirement of the first condition is
availability of dispatching demand response anytime when it is needed. The second
condition is that payment of LMP for DRR is proved to be cost-effective when demand
response is dispatched as an alternative resource.
As introduced before, it is cost effective when dispatching DRRs reduce the
amount of customers’ bill. While it still may lead an increased cost per unit to with the
decreased amount of load. There are three components that may result in the difference,
the LMP value of demand response, the total amount of dispatched demand response, and
the changing capability of energy market that is the most important key component.
However, from customer’s point, cost-effective condition is that when implementing
demand response does bring a demand reduction at LMP, the total amount, which
customers pay for demand response resources, is greater than the money spent in getting
access to the resources. For example, assume that a market has capacity of 200 MW and
$50/MWh LMP without DR. Currently, there is dispatched a 10 MW of demand response
where LMP is $40/MWh. With the participation of demand response, the total payment
to generators and load will become $8,000 instead of former $10,000 while the reduced
LMP is now being paid by 190 MW which is less than the previous load, 200 MW. After
calculation, every remaining customer only needs to pay 42.11/MWh ($8,000/190) that
decrease a lot from the previous payment, $50/MWh. Therefore, it is cost-effective to pay
LMP to demand response in this example. In comparison, customers have to endure a net
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loss when the reduction of total cost does not bring a decrease of each customer’s
payment. For instance, similar example to last one, change the adding LMP of demand
response to $48/MWh. The total payment to generators and load will become $9,600
instead of former $10,000 while the reduced LMP is still being paid by 190 MW. This
time, every remaining customer needs to pay 50.53/MWh ($9,600/190) that increase
slightly compared to the previous payment, $50/MWh. From this result, it can be referred
that payment of remaining customer apparently increases. Hence, customers experience a
net loss. In this situation, implementation of the net benefits test can appropriately help
RTO or ISO judge which condition customers will go through. Without the net benefits
test as a reference, the RTO’s or ISO’s economic dispatch would have no choice but to
select the lowest bid demand response even it potentially increase payment of customers.
From second example, it can be concluded that dispatching of demand response resource
would bring a higher price payment to remaining customers than payment to the next unit
of generation if the demand response resource is not much cheaper than the generation.
Then customers will suffer a net loss. While the lowest demand response resource will
still stay at first dispatching order because of most competitive price. This situation
cannot be considered as a cost-effective condition so that demand response cannot be
allowed to join in the market. In order to prevent similar situation happening in the reality,
the billing unit effect must be taken into account as a standard to decide whether and
demand response resources when demand response is ready for implement. Therefore, in
order to prevent a net loss for customers, the application of the net benefit test is
necessary to determine when the total benefit produced by reduced LMP from
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dispatching demand response resources surpasses the cost of those resources under
requirement of the Commission.
Even some commenters point out that it is incorrect to pay consumers for not
consuming electricity, the Commission states that DRR is worth being compensated for
consumption reduction because demand response can achieve the function as generation
can, keeping the balance of the market. Those commenters who point out the
inappropriateness inadequately understand an extraordinary characteristic of demand
response resources. It is necessary and important for demand response to offer an
instantaneous balance to maintain reliability of the market. Therefore, the Commission
makes its statement that demand response resources should be compensated at LMP for
the contribution it can provide to the organized wholesale energy markets.
Although great efforts has been proceeded to facilitate demand response, barriers
still remain and prohibit the willing of demand response to participate in the wholesale
energy market. The Commission wants to exclude barriers here. Appling appropriate
compensation method can accelerate the removing barriers processes. The formation of
these barriers usually contains several parts. First of all, the change of dynamic retail
prices is unpredictable; real-time information is confidential under each power companies;
there are not enough technologies and incentive methods informing their customers about
the changing retail price; the connection between wholesale and retail prices is vague and
undefined. The Commission concludes that paying LMP can help to remove current
barriers for new demand response providers and potentially informed them that they will
be fairly compensated. Elimination barriers for demand response certainly will increase
investment of demand response resources. It also encourages more people and groups to
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research and develop the resources. Moreover, the Commission also recognizes that
removing barriers does not mean that DR providers will be preferential treated. Instead, it
raises great competition for both generation and demand response. During the completion,
demand response resource has to not only balance supply and demand but also carefully
face competition from other demand response providers. Therefore, the Commission
needs to clarify the correct competition methods as well after simply removing barriers.
In this part, the Commission points out that demand response resources shouldn’t be paid
LMP-G in all hours. First of all, as mentioned before, when net benefits test decide that
demand response resources are cost-effective, demand response resource ought to be
compensated at LMP. Additionally, these arguments fail to realize that existing barriers
to demand response is the main reason leading an imperfect market. Paying LMP to
demand response has been proved to be right compensation way to remove barriers.
Moreover, the comments of paying LMP-G are built on the supposition that demand
response is regarded as an energy which may be purchased and sold in the energy market.
This assumption has already revised by the Commission. The Commission encourages in
a single pricing rule that will not be easily changed even difference in market structure,
state regulatory environment, and resource mixed during the ISOs and RTOs. When
demand response can balance under the net benefits test, no matter what differences are,
it is a cost-effective and alternative resource in the wholesale energy markets. It can be
compensated at LMP. Only further report and data release that there are huge differences
may bring change to payment of demand response resource, the Commission will check
and make decision on that payment method. Meanwhile, any one of conditions happens,
the balance will be broken. The net benefit test cannot be satisfied and the demand
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response is not cost-effective any more. The Commission’s findings in this Final Rule do
not reject other approaches to compensation. Actually, the Commission authorize each
ISO and RTO to develop own compensation method only if it is just and reasonable.

2.6.2

Net benefits test
This part is mainly about whether net-benefits test should be applied or not. As

mentioned in the last part, net benefit test is usually used to regulate when it is necessary
to compensate demand response with energy price related to LMP. There were still
different opinions about how to use net benefit test before the Commission made its final
call. First of all, some commenters think it is unnecessary to utilize net-benefit test. They
suggested using a static threshold, a net-benefit trigger, which is determined by ISO or
RTO. As an example, NYISO compensates demand response resources when the price
hits the threshold. Currently, the NYISO uses $75/MWh as its static bid threshold in the
day-ahead demand response program. Different with setting a stable and static threshold
point, other commenters believe that it cannot actually represent for changes occurred in
electricity. It may even bring inefficient dispatch of demand resources. Instead, they
assert that using a dynamic bid threshold can become more determinable when LMP
payment applies. For those people, they think that static bid threshold prevents the
participation of demand response programs. Therefore, a static threshold cannot simply
deal with changeable energy market prices while a dynamic one can. However, other
commenters still think that net benefit test is very important to decide when
compensation of demand response at LMP will be cost-effective. Therefore,
identification of those hours is essential as well. .
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In order to resolve problems discussed above, the Commission prepare two
distinct requirements for implementing the net benefits test. First of all, before the
Commission decide the cost effectiveness condition for demand response resources,
either ISO or RTO is required to run the net benefit test. Each RTO and ISO needs to
identify a price threshold by analyzing historical data and supply curve of previous year.
RTO and ISO have to take monthly basis into account as well. In a summary, based on
the historical data such as supplying curve, the ISOs and RTOs make a judicious decision
on exact point to set the monthly threshold. Moreover, the threshold price needs to be
updated every month to keep the data vivid. Actually, the approach of setting threshold
price adopted here may be available in the situations that the payment to demand
response is cost-effective even it is not LMP or that demand response is compensated at
LMP but it is not cost-effective.
Some commenters indicate that if demand response resources were paid LMP-G,
a net benefit would become unnecessary. Meanwhile others argue that a net benefits test
may ruin the former decision that DRRs have to be compensated at the LMP. Therefore,
the Commission notes that a demand response resource should be compensated and
treated equally as a generation resource should be because it is able to balance demand
and supply in the energy market under cost effective condition, regulated by net benefit
test. Hence, there is no reason to simply compensate demand response resources less than
LMP for not using net benefit test.
The Commission also requires each RTO and ISO to develop an additional
research besides constructing the net benefits. The research must contain the exact time
information when LMP payment to demand response resources can directly bring
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customers net benefits. In order to make the result more accurate for dynamic dispatching
of RTO and ISO, the dispatch algorithms of RTO and ISO need to be combined with
billing unit effect. The billing unit effect theoretically helps make sure that dispatched
demand response resources are in cost-effectiveness level. It cannot be denied that the
more information of dispatch algorithms Commission can grasp, the more precise result,
data will be. Therefore, it is necessary for RTO or ISO to develop an investigation, no
matter in which form, individually or comprehensively, examining both costs and effects
of a dynamic net benefit test implement when demand resources is being dispatched in
both day-ahead and real-time energy markets. More importantly, the billing unit effect
needs to be taken into consideration as well.
2.6.3

Measurement and Verification
As defined by the Commission, demand response curtailment can be regarded as

reduction in actual load while the NOPR did not set either verification or measurement
for it. Therefore, RTO or ISO has to take its own responsibility verifying and measuring
the availability and effectiveness of demand response programs. This part discusses that
every demand response participant develop unique baseline which is founded by RTO
and ISO based on historical data. Moreover, the baseline will become the standard
representing for the total dispatched amount of demand response to the wholesale market.
Similar to compensation methods, each RTO and ISO has its own measurement and
verification technique. Techniques are different depending on the characteristics of
demand response providers. Some commenters think that measurement and verification
become especially important because they greatly affect the completeness of a demand
response program. The compensation method about paying DR LMP in all hours is
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challenged here as well because there will be errors to measurement and verification.
Paying LMP in all hours not only swings the accuracy of measurement and verification
but also misrepresents customers’ normal electricity usage, especially during a long
period. Therefore, ISO-NE suggests that pay demand response LMP in a limited amount
of hours or days so that a demand resource could successfully and effectively clear in the
energy market. Another saying is paying LMP in all hours gain demand response unjust
profit for demand response because of baseline technique. Any shifts from baseline will
be rewarded. It is totally different from the original goal getting compensation when load
is shifted from high to low LMP hours. The management of shifting loads for all hours
may become more and more difficult in the future even that paying LMP in each hour is
not a current issue. Some commenters believe that in order to avoid disputation on
measurement and verification method, the measurement and verification method should
be uniformed. However, each RTO and ISO has own operation standard. Therefore, it
will be difficult for the Commission to unify all measurement and verification of different
RTOs and ISOs just like compensation methods. The Commission clarifies the
importance of measurement and verification to demand response programs. Moreover,
the Commission admits the diversity of measurement and verification for various RTOs
and ISOs. But those measurements and verifications must serve under certain rules, Phase
I and Phase II organized by the North American Energy Standards Board (NAESB). The
Commission continues to state that paying LMP to demand response has already be
declined by net benefit test. In conclusion, the Commission claims that ISOs and RTOs
have to run their measurement and verification under current requirements and develop
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appropriate modifications. Each RTO and ISO has to submit documents explaining how
its measurement and verification protocols set baselines.
2.6.4

Cost Allocation
Most commenters think that the cost allocation is one way to keep demand

response compensation level just and reasonable. Moreover, cost allocation is highly
believed to have close connection with net benefits. There are five methods for cost
allocation listed by commenters and usually each regional company is supposed to select
and employ its own a method.
Since cost allocation can address the negative balance which caused by the
difference between the money owed by RTO to resource and the profit directly obtained
from loads, the commission eventually decides that a cost allocation method is necessary
to warrant that ISOs and RTOs are capable of recovering the total expenditures coming
from demand response. Most of methods of cost allocation suggested are abandoned. A
correct cost allocation method defined by the Commission is that each RTO and ISO
allocates its costs based on the same proportion amount of demand response which is
dispatched to all entities. From the report submitted by the RTOs and ISOs, the modified
cost allocation method appropriately assign separate cost to those entities who take
advantages on the demand reduction.
2.6.5

Commission Jurisdiction
Some commenters show their concerns about how to standardize demand

response compensation in the wholesale energy market. They think it will significantly
affect generation retail rate involving compensation for demand response. The concerns
also catch several state commissions’ and LSEs’ attention because commission
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jurisdiction potentially affect the compensation of demand response. As an example of
commission jurisdiction, wide implement of advanced meters and demand response
programs have already raise efficient usage of energy. Because of the success of
implement, the Commission’s decision plays an important part in helping demand
response program work better in the wholesale energy market. However, the
Commission’s jurisdiction to set the compensation for demand response is questioned by
other commenters. Those commenters assert that it is retail regulatory authority to not
only consider locational policies but also set appropriate compensation level. There are
some commenters announcing that even the retail regulatory cannot directly interfere the
wholesale market, it impose changing retail rate design or reducing probability
participation on demand response through commission compensation level. On the
contrary, some commercial customers support the Commission’s authority on setting the
compensation level. The Commission is used to be officially offered such broad authority
including correct market flaws. In addition, retail rates represent for a combination of
locational condition. Therefore, the Commission cannot require demand response
compensation to be LMP minus retail rate. It is beyond the Commission’s jurisdiction.
To address disputation, the Order first admits that the Commission is authorized
to determine compensation level for demand response. This means that ISO and RTO has
to accept demand response bid which is regulated under the Commission.15 Actually, it is
tough to merge the Commission’s jurisdiction with state and federal jurisdiction because
the Commission cannot perform any rules or actions beyond state laws or decisions.
Furthermore, the Commission also cannot remove barriers for demand response
regardless of state’s regulation. However, the main purpose of the Final Rule is not
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encroaching state’s right. It is to facilitate the Commission to make sure that the rates are
charged at just and reasonable, not preferential. Therefore, the Commission doesn’t need
to restrain demand response compensation because of some commenters’ opinions about
abusing state regulatory authority. The Commission is to keep the wholesale energy at
just, reasonable, not unfair or preferential rate.

Chapter 3 Demand Response and Locational Marginal Price
3.1

Deamond Response
Demand response basically helps its customers reduce energy consumption. The

customers are willing to produce a reduction from their normal electric energy
consumption in response to the signal of an increasing price of electric energy or
incentive payments that are designed to conduct lower consumption of electric energy.
Especially when electricity usage reaches at critical time or electricity price is high
enough, demand response resource will inform their consumers to reduce electricity
consumption. Demand response can also be regarded as a method of managing consumer
consumption of electricity. Generally, when demand response occurs, there are two ways
that how customers response to requirement of reducing electricity consumption due to
high price. First, customers directly reduce their demand according to retail rates based
on wholesale prices. Secondly, customers provide demand response as an alternate
resource to balance supply and demand in case that emergency happens in organized
wholesale energy markets.
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3.1.1

Difference between DR and dynamic response
Demand response mechanisms usually shut off in respond to explicit request

which may in many forms. The dynamic demand devices passively shut off when there
sense stress on the grid. For example, when frequency of the grid drops, the dynamic
demand devices choose to close for take back the balance of the grid. On the contrary, if
the frequency passes the threshold, the dynamic demand devices will turn on creating
more load consuming extra power.
3.1.2

Demand response resource
Generally, DR resource represent for a resource that is able to offer demand

response. Wide implement of demand response resources is believed to have positive
benefits. Those benefits can enhance reliability and stability of DR operation, minimize
congestion and transmission constraints, avoid unstable price, increase the economic
efficiency of deregulated electricity markets, and mitigation of potential market power.16
Moreover, all of these benefits can also bring profits, reduction in electricity price, to its
customers. In a word, as an alternative resource to generation, DR resource greatly
achieves its function balancing the system when demand response resource is costeffectively dispatched.
Here is the statistics directly revealing how much electricity and money are saved
through DRR. According to US 2006, a reduction of 5% of peak demand, about
37,853MW, has been created in the US, thereby avoiding construction of 625 combustion
turbines which may save the cost around $2.4 billion. Then with savings from avoided
transmission and distribution, it can rise to $3 billion per year. The reason causing these
benefits is advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) which is one of DRR programs.
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Moreover, the number of peak load reduction increases to 5.8% in 2008.17 In the summer
of 2011, the number even reaches at 8.5%.18
Even there are so many benefits in DRR programs, existence of DRR’s barriers
still cannot be ignored. For instance, both residential and small commercial customers
would not like to participate in those programs. They do not care about time-varying
pricing either. Because compared to their other expenditures, saving from their total
electricity costs are relatively small. For some large industrial customers, they also do not
perceive the importance of load management. Normally, they are obligated to reduce
demand under demand response programs. Besides low participation in DRR, the
continuing changing policies about how to control DRR create ambiguous future of
demand response resources. Furthermore, state regulators cannot accept the modified
measurements quickly and it takes time to make a decision through conferences. Last but
not least, judgement may differ between state regulators and the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission. State regulators probably particularly focus on the states’ right
and profits. Take this as an example, only state regulators can deal with the costs caused
by implementation of DDR under no matter FERC support or not. Locational tradition,
culture beliefs and absence of related knowledge also becomes barriers for wide demand
response resources application. For instance, most of customers still think electricity
price is static and unchangeable.
3.1.3

Demand response programs
The main purpose of demand response programs is to decrease customers’

electricity consumption or shift peak consumption based on their preferences and
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lifestyles. Moreover, demand response programs can be split into two categories, timebased programs and incentive-based programs.
The time-based programs are about to handle dynamic price as the rate are
fluctuant synchronously with the change of the real time cost of electricity. Therefore, the
time-based programs will flatten the load curve in order to provide a reasonably high
electricity price at peak time and relatively low electricity price during off-peak period.
The time-based programs contain Time-of-Use (TOU) program, Critical Peak Pricing
(CPP) program, and Real Time Pricing (RTP) program. As a common time-based
program, TOU program determine the electricity price based on production costs in the
same period. Thus, the price will be always cheap in low load period, moderate in offpeak period and almost high in peak period.19 In summary, if the customers are willing to
accept the price offered by the TOU program and shift their electricity consumption
hours, there is no doubt that the peak demands will be effectively decreased and loads
will be easily transferred from peak to off-peak period.
On the other hand, different from the existence of the direct price rate signals
varying from time to time in the time based programs, incentive based programs mainly
encourage customers participation. The programs provide inducement or incentive
signals to their customers. According to incentive based programs, feedback from
customers are difficult to estimate and measure. Instead, incentive-based DR programs
rely on a more reliable and accurate instrument or software to manage costs and preserve
reliability. The incentive based programs consists of Direct Load Control (DLC),
Emergency Demand Response Program (EDRP), Interruptible/curtail able service (I/C),
Demand Bidding/Buy Back, Capacitiy Market Program (CMP), and Ancillary Service
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Markets (A/S). As one of the common incentive-based programs, DLC will remotely turn
off or shift usage period of a customer’s electrical equipment for a short time if the
unpredictable condition, like system reliability contingencies, happens. In exchange, their
customers enjoy bill credits or other compensation methods. By the way, operation of
DLC program will typically be active at peak hours. Figure 3.1 illustrates the
participation amount and load reduction for both time-based program and incentive-based
program.

Figure 3.1Application of Demand Response Programs in 2008 in the U.S.
From the chart, there were about 275 entities who participated in the incentivebased DR programs in 2008. And those incentive programs were capable of providing
nearly 38,000MW load reductions. On the other hand, time-based programs were able to
produce another 2,700MW though the participation of the time-based programs reached
505 entities that is greater than incentive participators. About 93% of the peak load
reductions in the U.S. were provided by all kinds of incentive-based programs.
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3.2

Local Marginal Price
Basically, ISOs or RTOs calculate LMPs at certain nodes, zones or locations

within the ISO or RTO footprint. LMPs used to compensate generators. In this research,
LMPs are used as compensation to demand response. There are variations ways how
RTOs and ISOs calculate LMPs. In the Final Rules of Order 745, nothing is intended to
change RTO and ISO methods for calculating LMP. More importantly, LMP is the
method to determine price at different locations
In ideal situation, the system has no constraints and losses so that electric energy
can flow to any node without any decrement through the transmission lines. Therefore,
all LMPs will be the same. The generator with the lowest energy price would effectively
serve the whole system. In reality, LMP usually differs from most locations. The cheapest
megawatt cannot access all location of the grid because of existence of constraints and
losses. These two situations will be analyzed in 3.2.3 part.
3.2.1

Three components in LMP
There are three components in the LMP. It will be easy to understand in this way

LMP = System Energy Price + Transmission Congestion Cost + Cost of Marginal
Losses20. (PLmp= PRef + PLoss + PCongestioni )
The energy component of all LMPs is the price for electric energy at the reference point
that is the load-weighted average of the system node prices.21 In a simple word, the
system energy price is optimal without congestion and losses. And price will be the same
in every bus. Sometimes, it is known as clearing price. Congestion price is the price
under binding constraints condition. The calculation of it contains two parts, marginal
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unit constraints and sensitivity factors. The congestion component reveals the marginal
cost of congestion at a node or the node price of average load-weighted of the system at
external node. The loss component at a particular node or external node reflects the cost
of losses. The loss price represents price of marginal losses and it will vary from different
location. More importantly, all those three components of LMP have to be calculated in
both day-ahead and real-time situation.
3.2.2

Day-Ahead and Real-Time LMP
Literally, the day-ahead LMP must be calculated in the day-ahead market. It

applies different kinds of information, like the energy offers and bids price, from
participants of all available location in the day-ahead market. The calculation is based on
some components such as constrained unit, dispatching model flows, system conditions,
least-cost, and so on. The main purpose of calculation is to minimize the three
components of LMP, the costs of energy, congestion, and transmission losses through a
linear method.
The calculation of the real-time LMPs uses each market participant’s energy offer
information. The optimized dispatch of energy is key component of this calculation.
Similar to the calculation of the day-ahead price, the calculation of the real-time LMP
utilizes a linear method to optimally minimize the cost of three LMP components. But
this calculation also needs to minimize the costs for lasting operation. The actual
changeable system condition should be put into consideration as well.
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3.2.3

Simple examples of LMP

Ex.1 System with no constraints displayed as Figure 3.2

G2
G1

B

A

Line Limit
D

Figure 3.2 A simple example of two generators and two buses
In this example, G1 has capacity of 150MW, and the energy price is 20$/MWh
G2 has capacity of 150MW as well, and the energy price is 25$/MWh
Load, D, demands 90MW
Line Limit is 100MW
Since the demand from load is 90MW which doesn’t exceed the line limit, the whole
energy from G1 is directly delivered to load. Therefore, it is unnecessary for G2 to supply
any energy. G1 is the only one marginal assert in this example. The LMP at A and B bus
will be the same. LMPA = LMPB = 20$/MWh

Ex2. System with a binding constraint
Same diagram but with different data,
G1 has capacity of 150MW, and the energy price is 20$/MWh
G2 has capacity of 150MW as well, and the energy price is 25$/MWh
Load, D, demands 120MW
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Line Limit is 100MW
In this situation, demand becomes 120MW. While energy generated from G1 can only
achieve 100MW due to the line limitation. The rest 20MW need to be supplied by G2.
Price at the location of each marginal asset is always equal to its offer or bid price. Then
there will be two marginal asserts and unique LMP at different locations. LMPA =
20$/MWh and LMPB = 25$/MWh
In conclusion, in no constraints area, some low cost generation can be dispatched
to cover the demand so that the price will be decreased. On the other hand, LMPs differ
at different locations because of congestion in the system. Moreover, it is impossible to
sever all loads with low cost. Higher-cost generation has to be dispatched to supply the
rest demand from load which may relatively increase price at these locations.

3.2.4

LMP calculation in matlab
When the case becomes more and more complicated, it is difficult to judge how

much power needs to be produced through each generator in order to get minimum
payment. Therefore, matlab will facilitate to optimize the process. First, here is a simple
example helping us know how to calculate LMP in the matlab.
Ex1.

Two units, U1 and U2, are required to generate such amount power in order to

satisfy such amount of power demand.
Unit 1: $40/MWh, Pmin = 0MW, Pmax = 800MW;
Unit 2: $50/MWh, Pmin = 0MW, Pmax = 600MW;
Demand: Pd = 700MW, 50 MW at bus 1 and 650 MW at bus 2.
And transmission line constraint is L MW which will be given later.
Figure 3.3 represent for a simple LMP calculation example in the Matlab.
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50MW

650MW

Figure 3.3 LMP calculated in matlab
To get result from matlab program, some formulations have to be established
ahead.
Minimize: 40Pg1 + 50Pg2; to get minimum total cost
Subject to: Pg1 + Pg2 = 700; the amount of energy generated by two units must
satisfy the total demand
0 ≤ Pg1 ≤ 800
0 ≤ Pg2 ≤ 600; low bound and up bound
Pg1 – 50 ≤ L; unit one should supply energy no more than demand at
but 1 plus line constraint L
Aeq * x = beq
Aineq * x ≤ bineq; eventually, x will be solved representing for energy
generated at unit 1 and 2 respectively
In this example, we assume that L equals 500MW
Matlab code:
f = [40; 50];
Aineq = [1, 0];
bineq = [550];
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Aeq = [1, 1];
beq = [700];
lb = [0; 0];
ub = [800; 600];
x0 = [];
options = [];
[x, fval, exitflag, output, lambda] = linprog(f, Aineq, bineq, Aeq, beq, lb, ub, x0,options)

Solution:
Pg1 = 550MW and Pg2 = 150MW
Total cost = 29,500
Energy marginal price: $50/MWh
Based on this example, the load at G1 node increases from 50MW to 51 MW,
several equations will change
Pg1 + Pg2 = 701
Pg1 – 51 ≤ 500
Then solution:
Pg1 = 551MW, Pg2 = 150MW
Total cost = 29,540
Since total cost increment is: 29540-29500 = 40, so the LMP at G1 is: $40/MWh.
Similarly, if the load at G2 node increase to 651MW, the solution will be:
Pg1 = 550MW, Pg2 = 151MW
Total cost = 29,550
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Since total cost increment is: 29550-29500 = 50, so the LMP at G2 is: $50/MWh.
Then use same approach to verify the former raised problem.

G2

A

G1

B

Line Limit

D
Figure 3.2 A simple example of two generators and two buses

Code: f = [20; 25]; %cost coefficients
Aineq = [1, 0];
bineq = [100];
Aeq = [1, 1];
beq = [120];
lb = [0; 0];
ub = [150; 150];
x0 = [];
options = [];
[x, fval, exitflag, output, lambda] = linprog(f, Aineq, bineq, Aeq, beq, lb, ub,
x0,options)
Result becomes: x = 100.00000; represent for energy distributed at G1
20.0000;

G2
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fval =2.5000e+003 ; total cost will be $2,500
Energy price is $25/MWh
Still change 1MW at bus 1 and bus 2 respectively
Then: If demand at but 1 becomes 1MW
Pg1 = 101MW, Pg2 = 20MW
Total cost = 2,520
Total cost increment is: 2520-2500 = 20,

LMP1 = $20/MWh

Similarly, if D = 121MW
Pg1 = 100MW, Pg2 = 21MW
Total cost = 2,525
Total cost increment is: 2525-2500 = 25,

LMP2 = $25/MWh

It is obvious that the result is same to the approach I used to work the problem
objectively.
But in real world, line constraint will be more complicated than a constant number. The
following example when line constraint is complex number, how to work out the problem.
Before the example, here is a knowledge point needed to be known about p.u. system. In
a p.u. system, when power is transferred from point 1 to point 2, like picture,
Figure 3.4 tells how to perform complex number calculation in a p.u. system.

1∠α1

1∠α2

p

①

②
jx

Figure 3.4 Complex number calculation in p.u. system
Then:

47

p = (α2 – α1) / x ; α2 and α1 are in radius
In this case, constraints will be easily obtained in a complex problem.
Ex2.

Unit 1: $40/MWh, Pmin = 0MW, Pmax = 800MW;
Unit 2: $50/MWh, Pmin = 0MW, Pmax = 600MW;
Unit 3: $55/MWh, Pmin = 0MW, Pmax = 600MW;
Unit 4: $60/MWh, Pmin = 0MW, Pmax = 700MW;
Demand: Pd = 1500MW, and load distributions are shown on the figure.
Transmission line impedances in per unit and constraints are labeled in the figure.

Sbase is set to 100MW. Figure 3.5 reveals a more complicated problem.
G1

0.1j
L1 MW

200MW

G2

350MW
0.2j
L3 MW

0.125j
L2 MW

G4
G3
L4
0.25j
450MW

500MW

Figure 3.5 LMP calculation of a complex problem in the matlab
Bus 1 is chosen as the reference, 1∠0°. Moreover, δ2, δ3and δ4 represent machine
angle for G2 and G3 respectively.
Minimize: 40Pg1 + 50 Pg2 + 55Pg3 +60Pg4
Subject to: Pg1 + Pg2 + Pg3 + Pg4 = 1500/100

48

Pg2 = (δ2 – 0) / 0.1 + (δ2 – δ3) / 0.2 + 350 / 100
Pg3 = (δ3 – δ2) / 0.2 + (δ3 – δ4) / 0. 25 + 450 / 100
Pg4 = (δ4 – 0) / 0.125 + (δ4 – δ3) / 0.25 + 500 / 100
δ2 / 0.1 ≤ L1
- δ2 / 0.1 ≤ L1
δ4 / 0.125 ≤ L2
- δ4 / 0.125 ≤ L2
(δ2 – δ3) / 0.2 ≤ L3
- (δ2 – δ3) / 0.2 ≤ L3
(δ3 – δ4) / 0.25 ≤ L4
- (δ3 – δ4) / 0.25 ≤ L4
0 ≤ Pg1 ≤ 800 / 100
0 ≤ Pg2 ≤ 600 / 100
0 ≤ Pg3 ≤ 600 / 100
0 ≤ Pg4 ≤ 700 / 100
Aeq * x = beq
Aineq * x ≤ bineq
Simplify above formula and apply them into matlab.
If L = [250, 200, 200, 250] MW
Code:
[L1, L2, L3, L4] = deal(2.50, 2.00, 2.00, 2.50);
f = [40, 50, 55, 60, 0, 0, 0];
Aeq = [1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0;
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0, 1, 0, 0, -15, 5, 0;
0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 4, 12;
0, 0, 1, 0, 5, -9, 4];
beq = [15; 3.5; 5; 4.5];
Aineq = [0, 0, 0, 0, -10, 0, 0;
0, 0, 0, 0, 10, 0, 0;
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, -8;
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8;
0, 0, 0, 0, 5, -5, 0;
0, 0, 0, 0, -5, 5, 0;
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, -4;
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, -4, 4];
bineq = [L1; L1; L2; L2; L3; L3; L4; L4];
lb = [0; 0; 0; 0; -inf; -inf; -inf];
ub = [8; 6; 6; 7; inf; inf; inf];
x0 = [];
options = [];
[x, fval, exitflag, output, lambda] = linprog(f,Aineq,bineq,Aeq,beq,lb,ub,x0,options);

Solution:
x = [8.0000; 2.3750; 1.1250; 3.5000; -0.2000; -0.3750; 0.2500]
Total cost = $71,062.5
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Chapter 4 The Proposed Compensation Method
This research proposes one possible compensation method for demand response,
which could unify current compensation methods. In the approach, the basic concept is
that the demand response providers will get compensation in amount of how much
energy customers save. Figure 4.1 shows the basic concept of optimal compensation
method.
kW

a
ΔL

Reduced Load
b
Actual Load

Time

Figure 4.1 Brief introduction of compensation method
At point a, suppose there is a certain amount of kWs which is obtained in the day-ahead
market. Point b represents the value actual load value detected by smart meter. Ideally,
the compensation to demand response resources should be (a – b) ×ΔL. The approach is
mainly about to compare and combine all current compensation methods and then get one
optimal method in this research. According to experience, net benefits can reach
enormously huge at peak period which potentially means demand response has
apparently positive affect at peak period. Therefore, a cost-effective analysis will be
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unnecessary at peak-load period. Demand response will be compensated at LMP during
peak-load period.
The following chart similarly represents the energy consumption in one community. In
this chart, there are two lines representing for energy assumption in day-ahead market
and real-time energy consumption respectively. Figure 4.2 is a close simulation to a real
problem.

Figure 4.2 Statistic applied in real situation
Suppose LMP is 30$/MWh;
Total compensation = (289.9-250.17) × 30 × 3 = $3575.7 ; at peak period 3-6PM
This is a simple example which has similar to reality. But as mentioned before,
day-ahead market is hourly calculated and real-time market calculate per 5 minutes.
Therefore, the different units need to be carefully recorded and calculated when the data
are measured. No matter how complicated data it is, the result will still be available with
the help of advance metering technique and certain measurements.
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At Low demand period, demand response can play as an emergent supply to
generation in case that disaster and outage happens. Just like the example mentioned
before, demand response resources were active to inform their customers to reduce
energy consumption to maintain the grid balance because 20% power plant was off-line
caused by a disaster happened in the Northeast area in the winter of 2014. In this situation,
when demand response resources are active, they still need to be compensated at LMP.
The contribution of demand response at emergent period cannot be ignored. Meanwhile,
the customers of demand response resources will be compensated with certain credits for
paying electricity bill in the future as well.
At off peak period, net-benefits test or cost effective test becomes especially
important to determine whether demand response resources should be compensated at the
price referred to LMP or not in this approach. If the net-benefit test or cost effective test
proves that it is reasonable to pay demand response with price related LMP, demand
response will be compensated at amount of LMP – Mi ,where Mi contains the money of
implementing cost effective test.
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Chapter 5 Conclusion
The court is about to rehear the case, Order 745, in order to prevent a setback to
demand response in the wholesale energy market. This research provides discussions of
demand response, locational marginal price, and Order 745. There may be limitations on
current demand response compensation methods, which may cause disputations among
different parties. Based on existing methods, this thesis proposes a possible compensation
method for demand response, which may be reasonable and may lessen disputations.
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Vita
EDUCATION
Major in Electrical Engineering
Bachelor degree received from University of Kentucky in May 2013, GPA 3.756
Be pursuing master degree in University of Kentucky, GPA 3.111
Expected graduating date: May 2015
COMPUTER SKILLS
Auto CAD, Keil uVision Altium Dsigner 6, Microsoft Office, Macromedia Flash, C
Learning this semester: PowerWorld, Wireshark, OPNET, Python

HONORS AND AWARDS
University of Kentucky, International Scholarship (Spring 2012-2013, Fall 2012-2013)
University of Kentucky, Spring 2012-2013 General Academic Scholarship Shanghai
Shanghai Ocean University’s Scholarship, Second Prize (Fall 2007)
Ocean University’s Scholarship, Third Prize (Spring 2008, Fall 2008, Spring 2010)

WORKING EXPERIENCE
Commons Market (3/1/2012–5/1/2014) – Work part-time in commons market that locates
on campus. The job is related with food service.
EE 383 Lab (10/1/2013–5/1/2014) – Volunteer to work in the lab under permission of Dr.
Meikang Qiu. Assist the professor and his TA with embedded system work.
Shanghai Installation Engineering Co., Ltd (3/12/2011—7/31/2011) – I assisted Electrical
Engineers in a construction project, Shanghai Oriental Sports Center. Knowledge learned
contains calculating wire length between power distribution room and devices like a
socket, switches and so on, ensuring that the workers installing the correct devices in the
right positions, contacting the company who offers devices if the devices are broken,
going to construction site to check that everything is in good condition everyday.
Dramana Fish and Chips (6/18/2010–8/13/2010) – Volunteered at a fast food shop in
Australia. Served customers/learned English
Shanghai Heiji Air Conditioning and Equipment Company (6/1/2009–9/1/2009) –
Performed simple office jobs, such as typing, answering phone calls, and serving visitors.
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